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“Today’s [agent] 
recruiters must learn and 
use the significant 
breakthroughs in 
understanding of human 
motivations and the 
means for influencing 
them that have occurred 
”
since the early 1980s.Ask any CIA National Clandes-
tine Service officer what his or her 
mission is and the likely reply will 
be “to recruit spies to steal secrets 
and conduct covert action.” This 
mission has been relatively 
unchanged since the founding of the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
on 13 June 1942. What has changed 
is the profile of the people we ask to 
become agents to steal the secrets 
and engage in covert action. In this 
article I will discuss how we trained 
OSS and CIA officers to find and 
recruit the people who became our 
agents.
The story starts with World War II, 
when OSS officers were largely 
focused on appealing to the patrio-
tism of people to resist foreign occu-
piers. There was no overall strategy 
for finding the right agents other 
than linking up with local activists 
and appealing to their national pride. 
The paper then moves to the Cold 
War when the focus for recruitment 
shifted to state actors who had the 
placement and access to betray the 
secrets of the communist govern-
ments in power. During the Cold 
War period and today, agents who 
agreed to spy are said to do so for 
reasons that imply weakness or vul-
nerability: money, ideology, black-
mail, or ego. These factors are 
captured in the mnemonic MICE. It 
is a framework that I believe has 
outlived its usefulness. Today’s 
recruiters of agents abroad often 
pursue non-state actors with com-
plex mixtures of competing loyal-
ties, including family, tribe, religion, 
ethnicity, and nationalism.
I argue that today’s recruiters must 
learn and use the significant break-
throughs in understanding of human 
motivations and the means for influ-
encing people that have occurred 
since the early 1980s. In particular, I 
will discuss the work of Dr. Robert 
Cialdini and how his six influence 
factors, reciprocation, authority, 
scarcity, commitment (and consis-
tency), liking, and social proof—
RASCLS—could be applied to 
motivate potential agents to agree to 
spy and to improve the productivity 
of existing agents.
However, before I look at how we 
have trained officers to recruit in the 
past and how we should recruit in 
the future, I think we should first 
examine what we are asking people 
to do when they become spies.
 Is Spying Rational in the Face of 
the Risks?
On the surface, committing espio-
nage appears to be less than ratio-
nal. Agents risk death, either at the 
hands of an enemy or by their own 
legal systems. Even some countries 
that do not impose the death penalty s, March 2013) 7 
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Six Principles of Agent Recruitment for criminal acts make exceptions 
for spies.
Spies risk lengthy imprisonment if 
caught. Even in peacetime settings, 
if not imprisoned, exposed spies will 
almost certainly lose whatever job 
they had, their reputations, and pos-
sibly their families and friends. 
Given these risks, why would a 
rational person agree to become an 
agent for a foreign power? Why 
endure the fear of compromise, 
make the effort to collect and deliver 
secrets, and live a double life for 
years on end when the rewards for 
your work cannot be openly enjoyed 
without risking being caught and 
punished?
Arguably, this question was more 
easily answered during WW II and 
the Cold War, when enemies were 
encountered daily and relatively eas-
ily identified. Espionage repre-
sented opportunities to strike back. 
However, even in wartime, it is eas-
ier for individuals to sit back, let 
others take the risks, and hope their 
work will result in victory and 
rewards for everyone.
Overcoming this “free rider 
dilemma” may have been easier for 
the OSS officer working in occu-
pied countries, particularly as the 
war appeared to turn against the 
Axis powers and peer pressure 
increased on citizens of occupied 
countries to prove they played some 
part in resistance movements and 
were not collaborators. In both war 
and peace, the potential agent had to 
come to the conclusion that the 
potential benefits of agreeing to spy 
were greater than the potential costs 
of inaction. 1
The need to address and minimize 
risks while maximizing benefits is at 
the heart of successful agent recruit-
ment. From the beginning, OSS pro-
fessionals recognized that art and 
science was involved in recruiting 
agents for paramilitary and clandes-
tine intelligence missions. The same 
was true in the training of the OSS 
officers who would acquire and han-
dle agents. 2 Psychologists in the still 
developing field of “operational psy-
chology” were integral to selecting 
OSS officers and teaching them to 
recruit foreign agents in the field. 3
Agent Recruitment Training in 
the OSS
Despite the contributions of the 
operational psychologists, there was 
still more art than science in the 
training OSS officers received in the 
recruitment and handling of agents. 
While most histories of the OSS 
tend to focus on its paramilitary 
activities under the Special Opera-
tions (SO) branch, the lesser known 
Secret Intelligence (SI) branch was 
also a core part of the OSS from the 
start. The SI branch opened its for-
mal training school in May 1942, 
when OSS was still the Office of the 
Coordinator of Information. While 
SO students focused on learning 
basic commando skills, leading 
resistance groups, and penetrating 
defense plants to collect informa-
tion, SI students concentrated on less 
direct measures—agent recruitment, 
handling, and communications. 
However, both the SO and SI 
branches included elements of the 
others’ training. 4
A review of the syllabi for the Pre-
liminary Training School, the 
Advanced Training School, and the 
SI Specialist School of the OSS 
shows agent recruitment and han-
dling was not discussed at all in the 
Preliminary Training School. Only 
two of the 50 blocks of instruction in 
the Advanced Training School were 
focused on this subject. SI officers 
received one additional block of 
instruction on “rating of sources” in 
the 10 classes that made up their 
“Specialist School.” 5
Despite the relatively short time 
spent on these subjects, OSS offi-
1 Overcoming the “free rider dilemma” is the reason CIA case officers are taught to “put the benefits up front” in their recruitment pitches, though it is 
unlikely that more than a handful could justify this approach beyond saying, “That is how I was taught.”
2 The word “agent” was often used in the OSS to refer both to OSS officers and the people they recruited, which can often be confusing. I will only use the 
word to refer to the person being recruited to obtain secrets or carry out covert activities. I will refer to the person recruiting the agent as either “officer” or 
“case officer.”
3 For a full account of this process in the early days of the OSS, see OSS Schools and Training Branch, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the 
Office of Strategic Services, available in GoogleBooks.
4 For details of OSS training see John Whiteclay Chambers II, “Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,” Studies in Intelligence 54, No. 2 
(June 2010), available on www.cia.gov.
5 SO Training Syllabus No. 42, approved by OSS Director Colonel Donovan, 30 August 1942. Accessed on CIA FOIA website, June 2012.
Despite the contributions of OSS psychologists and psychia-
trists, there was much more art than science in training OSS of-
ficers to recruit and handle agents.8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 
 
Six Principles of Agent Recruitment cers were instructed that “Recruit-
ing is a very vital operation and 
requires firstly—good information. 
Secondly—successful and careful 
planning.” 6 OSS recruiters were 
instructed to approach recruiting 
agents along the lines shown below.
This list of suggestions, starting 
with “survey the pool of potential 
agents and put quality first” and 
ending with “Do Not Try to Buy 
People,” constituted the founda-
tion of agent recruitment tradecraft 
for the OSS officer. While some of 
the suggestions may sound famil-
iar to current trainees, much of 
what would now be considered key 
first steps of the agent recruitment 
cycle were left to the imagination 
and creativity of the OSS officer. 7
The Cold War Perspective
The warning at the end of this list, 
“Do Not Try to Buy People,” marks 
a sharp distinction between WW II 
approaches and those of the Cold 
War, when the injunction lost much 
of its force. Today, when asked the 
question “Why do people spy?” the 
average case officer would respond 
with four words: “Money, Ideology, 
Compromise, and Ego”—MICE—
and money would be the motive that 
most quickly comes to mind.
MICE: Money
On the surface, money, or what 
money can provide (such as secu-
rity, education for children, a better 
living standard, or a ticket out of an 
undesirable environment), seems to 
be a rational reason to take on the 
risks of spying. Certainly a long list 
of individuals who have volunteered 
to provide intelligence to their coun-
try’s enemies have cited the need for 
money as their reason. In a study of 
104 Americans who spied and were 
caught between 1947 and 1989, the 
majority, indeed an increasing num-
ber over the years studies, reported 
that money was their sole or pri-
mary motivator. 8 For example, early 
Cold Warrior, GRU Lieutenant Col-
onel Pyotr Popov, sold Soviet secrets 
to the Americans in Vienna in 1953 
in order to maintain both a wife and 
a mistress. Starting during the Cold 
War and continuing after the Iron 
Curtain had fallen, CIA officer 
Aldrich Ames, arrested in 1994, sold 
American secrets to Moscow for an 
estimated $2.7 million. 9
6 Ibid, 4–5.
7 The agent recruitment cycle will be more fully discussed in the next section. For purposes of this paper it is the process of obtaining HUMINT agents to meet 
national intelligence needs. The six stages of the cycle are spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, handling/training, and turning over the agent to a new 
officer or terminating contact with the agent.
8 Katherine L Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947–2007, Department of Defense Technical Report 08-05, March 2008. During the initial 32 
years of the study, 47 percent of the spies then active claimed to be in it for the money. That percentage grew among those revealed between 1980 and 1989 to 
74 percent.
OSS Steps to Recruitment
• Survey the locality: state of local opinion, industry, and occupations.
• Consider the types of spies needed—insiders, specialists, cutouts, accommodation 
addresses, couriers, collectors of imported material, stores of material, headquarters, 
women.
•Survey potential agents—It is from ranks of an informant service that first recruits are 
most likely to be drawn (emphasis added)—many of the remainder will be indicated 
by the same means.
•Put quality first—a bad agent will jeopardize an organization. Get full information 
about a potential agent before approaching him e.g. interests, weaknesses, character, 
religion, politics, nationality, etc.
•Approach to potential agents—Get to know your man.
•Self-introduction
•Introduction by mutual friend
•Coming down to business—Change your line of appeal to suit the case, e.g. for a 
priest, based on religious grounds, etc.
•Let any concrete suggestions come from him in the first stages.
•Test reactions thoroughly before coming out into the open.
•Sound by half-suggestions.
•Leave yourself a way out in the event of refusal.
•From the first give him an impression that we are part of a powerful and well orga-
nized body—prestige counts heavily.
• DO NOT TRY TO BUY PEOPLE (emphasis in original)Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 9 
 
Six Principles of Agent Recruitment Both men were caught and pun-
ished. Popov, who was probably 
paid a few thousand dollars over the 
course of his agent career, spent his 
money carefully and was most likely 
betrayed by the British spy, George 
Blake. 10 Ames helped reveal him-
self by spending his ill-gotten gains 
openly. As a GS-14 making less than 
$70,000 a year, Ames not only pur-
chased a house for more than 
$500,000 in cash, he made the addi-
tional mistake of buying a $40,000 
Jaguar he drove to work. 11
Popov’s career as an agent ended 
in 1958 with a bullet to the back of 
the head, and Ames’ employment as 
an agent ended in 1994 with a life 
sentence. Looking at the monetary 
benefits alone, it would be hard to 
argue that the short-term rewards—
five years of the good life in Popov’s 
case and nine years for Ames—was 
worth the price each paid. However, 
as we will see, it is likely that money 
was not the only motivating factor in 
either of these cases. To understand 
what factors were really at play, we 
will have to look beyond MICE.
MICE: Ideology
More than the “venal” recruit who 
pursues money, an ideologically 
driven agent is seen as a much 
greater threat by counterintelligence 
(CI) officers. For CIA recruiters, 
agents who serve for reasons of 
belief are the only agents that most 
officers can truly respect. US 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
senior analyst Ana Belen Montes 
admitted to spying for Cuba for 
more than 16 years and was paid no 
salary other than her DIA GS-15 
wage. 12 GRU Colonel Oleg Pen-
kovsky, sometimes called “The Spy 
Who Saved the World” for his con-
tributions during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, spied for the CIA and British 
MI6 jointly between 1961 and 1963, 
with only the promise of being 
“taken care of” if he decided to leave 
the Soviet Union and settle in the 
West. 13 
One of the most amazing agents of 
all, MI6’s Harold A. R. (Kim) 
Philby, who was considered a candi-
date to lead Britain’s Secret Intelli-
gence Service in the 1950s, spied for 
the Soviet Union without compensa-
tion from 1933 until he defected to 
the USSR in 1961. 14 All three agents 
said they spied for the same reason, 
ideology.
Clearly an agent committed to an 
ideology can be a powerful weapon. 
One wonders how agents like Mon-
tes and Philby could not only func-
tion year after year while immersed 
in a political system they opposed 
but actually thrive and be repeatedly 
promoted by the very people they 
were betraying. 15 Both Montes and 
Philby only ended their spying 
careers when exposed or about to be 
exposed. Montes was arrested, tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to a long 
prison term. Philby defected to the 
USSR, where he lived as a Soviet 
citizen until his death in 1988. Was 
it just zealotry that drove individu-
als like Montes and Philby to live 
double lives for decades? Or were 
there other factors at work?
MICE: Coercion or Compromise
Coercion or compromise (black-
mail) provide relatively easy-to-
understand reasons agents take on 
the risks of espionage—as seen in 
countless movies and CI training 
films. 16 Both factors appear in many 
past spy cases. Compromise most 
often occurs when potential agents 
make mistakes and come to believe 
they must seek the assistance of a 
9 For good discussions of Pyotr Popov see John L. Hart’s, “Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The Tribulations of Faith,” Intelligence and National Security 12 
(1977) or William Hood’s, Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA (Norton and Company, 1982). 
10 Norman Palmer, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage (Random House Reference, 1996), 446.
11 Ibid, 22.
12 See Steve Carmichael, True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes, Cuba’s Master Spy (US Naval Institute Press, 2007). 
13 Although Penkovsky was never able to enjoy his life in the West, his family was cared for, both through money banked for him and the proceeds of the com-
mercial sale of a book based on his life. The CIA secretly arranged the publication of The Penkovsky Papers, presented as his “diary” and funneled the bulk of 
the profits to his family. See the CIA FOIA under “Penkovsky.”
14 An exhaustive study of both Kim Philby and his equally fascinating father can be found in Anthony Cave Brown’s, Treason in the Blood (Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1994).
15 Montes received multiple awards for “exceptional analytic work” and was promoted to GS-15. Philby was repeatedly promoted, to the point that he came 
very close to becoming director of MI6.
16 A large sample of such films is available on YouTube. One good example is “The Enemy Agent & You,” a counterespionage film made by the Department 
of Defense in 1954 (DOD IS 7).
To understand what factors were really at play, we will have to 
look beyond MICE.10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 
 
Six Principles of Agent Recruitment foreign intelligence agency to avoid 
punishment. 
Compromise and coercion were 
clearly prime concerns of CI offi-
cials during the Cold War. Anyone 
with a security clearance was 
warned that any illegal or “deviant” 
behavior as defined in the day put a 
person at risk of being blackmailed 
into spying. Stories abound in both 
fiction and nonfiction of officials 
being coerced on account of their 
illicit sexual behavior, whether it 
was homosexuality or adultery 
resulting from being caught in the 
“honey traps” set by the infamous 
Soviet “sparrow squads.” 17 
In addition to these sordid stories, 
CIA officers also knew that many of 
their brethren in the FBI and other 
US law enforcement agencies regu-
larly coerced informants, often over-
looking criminal offenses or 
working to mitigate consequences in 
exchange for cooperation.
People coerced into espionage 
rarely make ideal agents. While FBI 
and other law enforcement officials 
may be able to offer a choice 
between jail and cooperation, it is 
actively discouraged in CIA train-
ing. Coercion often creates agents 
who are angry, resentful, and only 
willing to do just enough to avoid 
whatever punishment may await 
them. This is not the type of agent a 
case officer wants to meet in a for-
eign country, where both may be 
violating local laws by their interac-
tion and where agents have more 
opportunities to double cross or take 
violent action against a case officer.
MICE: Ego or Excitement
The final letter in MICE can stand 
for “Ego” or “Excitement.” Of the 
two, ego satisfaction appears to be the 
more prevalent driver. Spy fiction 
may portray espionage as an exciting 
world of gun battles, explosions, car 
chases, and sexual adventures, but 
anyone who has lived in this world 
knows the truth is very different. For 
every hour spent on a street a case 
officer will spend many hours more 
writing up the results of the last meet-
ing, preparing for the next meeting, 
and endlessly evaluating current 
cases and constantly looking for new 
assets. For the agent’s part, the life is 
usually equally dull and demanding. 
Successful agents must continue to 
perform in whatever jobs provide 
them the access for which they were 
recruited in the first place, all the 
while meeting the tasks levied by 
case officers.
Agents must also prepare for and 
securely move to and from meet-
ings, and, if they are good, they will 
constantly be looking for new ways 
to meet the information needs of the 
organization they secretly serves. A 
double life is not an easy life as evi-
denced by the number of agents who 
burn out, break down, or simply 
decide they cannot continue, particu-
larly in high risk environments. 
Agents often either stop producing 
or start making so many mistakes 
that case officers must suspend the 
relationships for the safety of both 
parties.
Excitement, if it exists, is fleeting, 
but reinforcement of an agent’s self-
confidence, or ego, can go a long 
way toward maintaining the agent’s 
productivity. As part of this 
dynamic, one often finds a desire for 
revenge or retaliation as a motiva-
tor. Examples include the disgrun-
tled professional diplomat; the 
passed-over military officer who 
would not “play politics”; the intelli-
gence officer sidelined for a drink-
ing problem; or the law enforcement 
official forced to moonlight as a 
security guard to make ends meet. 
Under the MICE framework, these 
are all agents waiting to be recruited. 
They only need to have egos stroked 
and to be given the chance to harm a 
system that has wronged them. Such 
reasons may provide good begin-
nings on the road to espionage, but 
will they keep agents on that road 
for decades? How then might case 
officers move beyond MICE to 
solidify and optimize the long-term 
commitment of a productive agent?
From MICE to RASCLS
Although MICE provides superfi-
cial explanations for spying, it fails 
to capture the complexities of human 
motivation. For example, let us 
return to the case of Aldrich Ames. 
In 1985, he walked into the Soviet 
embassy in Washington DC with the 
stated intent of avoiding bankruptcy 
by trading information on assets sus-
pected of being double agents for 
$50,000. 18 
This was to be a one-time only 
exchange. The Soviet embassy’s 
KGB chief of counterintelligence, 
17 Even the Russian news organization Pravda openly reported on the use of sexual blackmail by the KGB, see “KGB Sex Espionage,” Pravda, 7 August 
2002.
18 Pete Earley, Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames (Berkley Books, 1998), 147.
People coerced into espionage rarely make ideal agents. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 11 
 
Six Principles of Agent Recruitment Victor Cherkashin, accepted Ames’ 
information, paid him the $50,000, 
and then masterfully ensured that 
this first encounter would not be the 
last. Cherkashin did not threaten or 
otherwise coerce Ames. Instead, he 
worked to earn his confidence and 
drew him into a shared effort to pro-
tect him:
“Look,” I continued, exag-
gerating, but not really 
dissembling, “our main con-
cern—our one concern—is 
your security. I want you to 
know that for certain. Every-
thing else is secondary. You 
tell me what you want us to 
do and we’ll do it. We’ll play 
by any rules you give us.”
Cherkashin continued:
It’s in your interest to tell us 
as much as you can about any 
of your agents inside the 
KGB.… How can we protect 
you if we don’t know who’s in 
a position to inform the CIA 
about you? If you’re con-
cerned about your security, 
it’s up to you and us to mini-
mize the danger for you. We 
need to know whom to pro-
tect you from. 
With that, 
[Ames] took out a notepad 
and paper and began writing 
down a list of names. He tore 
out the page and handed it to 
me. I was shocked. That piece 
of paper contained more 
information about CIA espio-
nage than had ever before 
been presented in a single 
communication. It was a cat-
alog of virtually every CIA 
asset within the Soviet Union. 
Ames said nothing about 
whether the men he’d listed 
should be arrested or 
removed. “Just make sure 
these people don’t find any-
thing out about me,” he 
said. 19
What happened here? Was this a 
simple case of money starting a rela-
tionship, with concern about compro-
mise just adding to it? Are these two 
motives sufficient to explain the 
actions of Ames? The MICE frame-
work, even allowing for two factors 
at work, is not sufficient to under-
stand his motivations and behavior. 
Human motivations are far more 
complex. By subscribing too fully to 
the limited MICE framework, offi-
cers risk misreading their agents and 
take actions harmful to their opera-
tions. For example, by attributing an 
agent’s cooperation to a simple need 
for money, a case officer makes the 
mistake of causing a committed 
agent to feel merely like hired help. 
Post-WW II operations officer 
Christopher Felix put it this way in 
his Short Course on the Secret War:
Time and again I have seen 
American case officers resort 
to cutting off funds to enforce 
discipline over an agent. One 
effect of this maneuver, if suc-
cessful, is ultimately to reduce 
the agent to the status of a 
mere pensioner. In espionage 
operations this can, and often 
does, result in highly unreli-
able information; in a 
political operation it can be 
fatal. 20
Case officers who rely exclusively 
on the MICE framework risk failing 
to see the full complexities involved 
in an agent’s decision to spy and will 
miss opportunities to persuade and 
motivate agents to improve their per-
formance. Instead, they will focus on 
taking advantage of vulnerabilities 
to exercise control. Over time, the 
negative focus could lead case offi-
cers to view and treat their agents as 
fundamentally flawed human beings 
who need to be punished or coerced 
into compliance.
The work of psychologist Dr. Rob-
ert Cialdini offers more positive 
approaches. His six “weapons of 
mass influence”— reciprocation, 
authority, scarcity, commitment/con-
sistency, liking, and social proof—
provide a better foundation for agent 
recruitment and handling. 21
Cialdini’s Six Principles
To understand why the RASCLS 
principles are so important, case 
officers must understand that 
humans have developed shortcuts to 
19 Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, Spy Handler, Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of the Man who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich 
Ames (Basic Books, 2005), 27–29.
20 Christopher Felix, A Short Course in the Secret War (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1963), 54.
21 Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (Quill/William Morrow, 1984). Cialdini is the source of the six principles of influence, but my 
friend and colleague Steve Kleinman was the first to codify these principles under the mnemonic RASCLS.
By subscribing too fully to the limited MICE framework, officers 
risk misreading their agents.12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 
 
Six Principles of Agent Recruitment Some individuals [“compliance professionals”] have become 
quite skilled in using these principles to manipulate others into 
taking actions that are not necessarily in their best interests.
function in a world full of sights, 
sounds, and other stimuli flooding 
human senses. These shortcuts 
Cialdini calls “fixed actions pat-
terns,” which are patterns of behav-
ior that occur in the same order and 
sequence every time a given stimu-
lus is introduced. In the animal 
world these fixed patterns are easily 
observed in courtship and mating rit-
uals. They have evolved because 
humans need them too. Otherwise, 
as Cialdini observes, “We would 
stand frozen—cataloging, apprais-
ing, and calibrating—as the time for 
action sped by and away.” 22 
The universal human responses to 
these six principles help people 
interact with less friction and, for the 
most part, provide benefits. How-
ever, some individuals have become 
quite skilled in using these princi-
ples to manipulate others into acting 
against their best interests. These 
“compliance professionals,” as 
Cialdini labels them, are found, for 
example, among sales people, fund-
raisers, and “confidence artists.” The 
keys to their success, according to 
Cialdini, are that they understand the 
principles of influence and persua-
sion and they have learned how to 
manipulate without appearing to be 
manipulative.
By understanding Cialdini’s six 
principles, case officers could also 
become, in effect, better compliance 
specialists, with deeper understand-
ing of their tradecraft and greater 
ability to see opportunities to find 
and recruit agents from a population 
beyond those defined by the vulnera-
bilities exploitable in the MICE 
framework.
RASCLS in the Agent 
Recruitment Cycle
Before diving into the details of 
RASCLS, we need to understand 
more deeply how case officers work. 
The systematic method for finding 
agents who will meet national intel-
ligence information needs is called 
the Agent Recruitment Cycle 
(ARC). It consists of six steps:
• spotting (or identifying) individu-
als who can meet intelligence 
needs as identified by analysts or 
policymakers
• assessing whether the spotted indi-
viduals have the placement and 
access to provide desired informa-
tion as well as beginning the pro-
cess of determining their 
motivations, vulnerabilities, and 
suitability
• developing a relationship with the 
individual to further assess the fac-
tors above and to explore whether 
they will be responsive to initial 
tasking for intelligence informa-
tion
• the actual recruitment
• training and handling meetings 
with the agent, including taskings 
and debriefings
• either turning an agent over to 
another case officer or terminating 
the relationship
Successful case officers move 
agents through this cycle by using 
many of the principles of RASCLS 
without realizing the psychology 
behind their successes. Within the 
CIA these officers are often called 
“natural recruiters,” and because 
their skills are not well understood 
and believed to be inherent, CIA 
trainers miss opportunities to help 
case officer trainees develop their 
potential to become compliance spe-
cialists capable of fully applying the 
RASCLS principles.
RASCLS: Reciprocation
“Always provide amenities.” This 
is one of the earliest lessons taught 
to case officers in their training. 
Whether the meeting is to be an 
extended discussion in a hotel or a 
quick talk in a moving car, the case 
officer is told to always have some-
thing for the role-player agent to eat 
and drink. If a student asked “why,” 
(which was never encouraged), the 
likely reply would be “to build rap-
port” or the old standby, “that is the 
way I was taught.” It is an honest 
question that deserves a better 
response.
The true answer lies in the princi-
ple of reciprocation: all humans feel 
an obligation to try to repay in kind 
what another person has provided. 
According to Cialdini, there is no 
human society that does not abide by 
this rule. 23 We see the power of this 
principle reflected in innumerable 
cultures that insist on sharing tea or 
other refreshments before “getting 
down to business.” In American cul-
22 Ibid., 7.
23 Ibid., 18.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 13 
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dinners, luncheons, or cocktail hours 
used for rapport-building and devel-
opment of a shared sense of obliga-
tion.
The principle of reciprocation is 
almost always employed at the 
beginning of a recruitment cycle. 
One of the easiest ways for a case 
officer to initiate and develop a rela-
tionship with a potential agent is to 
fill some small need the agent has 
revealed. Whether this is help with a 
visa, information on academic 
opportunities in the United States, or 
just advice on a minor problem, by 
the small gesture a case officer cre-
ates a sense of obligation. At a mini-
mum, the gesture provides a reason 
for further contact and sets the stage 
for a case officer to seek a favor in 
return.
A feeling of obligation can be cre-
ated without actually giving any-
thing of real value. Cialdini calls this 
psychological concept “reciprocal 
concessions” or “rejection and 
retreat.” To illustrate this concept, he 
tells the story of being approached 
by a Boy Scout. The boy asked 
Cialdini if he would like to buy a 
ticket to a “Boy Scout Circus” for 
five dollars. When Cialdini did not 
immediately respond, the scout 
added “Or, you could buy one of our 
big chocolate bars. They are only a 
dollar each.” As expected, despite 
the fact that Cialdini claims not to 
even like chocolate, two dollars and 
two chocolate bars soon changed 
hands. 24 By first offering tickets to 
the circus, and then immediately fol-
lowing up with a different offer— 
before the first was openly 
rejected—the scout appeared to 
make the first concession, which 
immediately triggered in Cialdini a 
feeling of obligation to supply a 
reciprocal concession.
As he did with all the influence 
principles in his book, Cialdini field 
tested the theory of reciprocal con-
cessions through a series of well-
documented experiments in which 
unwitting subjects were offered a 
poor choice and less onerous second 
choice. In a statistically significant 
number of the cases, those offered 
the “rejection and retreat” scenario 
agreed to the secondary request, 
while those offered only the lesser 
choice declined. As a bonus, 
researchers found that once a com-
mitment was made to the less oner-
ous choice, the subject was even 
more susceptible to future requests. 
These phenomena will be further 
discussed under “commitment and 
consistency,” but the benefits for the 
case officer are clear: favors or gifts 
given to a potential agent early in a 
relationship are more likely to cre-
ate feelings of obligation. Then as a 
relationship develops, case officers 
can use rejection and retreat to make 
initial taskings seem less burden-
some and create an atmosphere in 
which future taskings will appear to 
be less onerous.
RASCLS: Authority      
The OSS advice, “From the first 
give an impression that we are part 
of a powerful and well organized 
body—prestige counts heavily,” still 
rings true. From childhood we are 
taught that compliance with author-
ity brings rewards while resistance 
brings punishment. Most opera-
tional cover stories are built to give 
CIA officers the air of authority— 
through some official government 
status or the appearance of a suc-
cessful businessperson. In both 
cases, officers are encouraged to 
“look the part” in their dress or with 
props.
The air of authority gives case offi-
cers advantages in the agent recruit-
ment process. In the development 
phase, case officers will often dem-
onstrate their authority by indicating 
they have special positions or pow-
ers beyond whatever jobs they claim 
to hold in the US government or 
business. These may include, for 
example, the power to hire and 
richly reward consultants. This air of 
authority can be especially magni-
fied in the recruitment phase, partic-
ularly if case officers can suggest 
they have the prestige of the US 
government behind the developing 
relationship.
Case officers also must understand 
the power inherent in their relation-
ships with agents. As Felix pointed 
out, “The case officer represents the 
authority which defines the objec-
tives of the operation, and he con-
trols the resources which make the 
operation possible.” 25 Optimally this 
control will be implicit rather than 
explicit. Threatening to withhold 
money to exert control represents a 
failure to develop optimal influence 
over the agent. In addition to the 
authority inherent in a case officer’s 
position relative to an agent, the case 
24 Ibid., 36.
25 Felix, 47.
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Six Principles of Agent Recruitment By building this sense of urgency, a successful case officer will 
use scarcity to… get agents to commit to new and deeper rela-
tionships.
officer’s strongest claim to authority 
is greater knowledge of the opera-
tional environment, of which the 
agent can only be partly aware. A 
case officer must be able to con-
vince an agent that, although the 
agent is a key partner in an opera-
tion, the agent is not the case offi-
cer’s only resource.
Under the MICE framework, case 
officers too often have gotten caught 
up in discussions over how much 
“control” they have over a source, 
which often has led to attempts to tie 
control to something measurable, 
like money. This battle for control is 
a reflection of the generally nega-
tive attributes of MICE. If an agent 
is only in a relationship for money, 
then money does represent control. 
A better discussion would include 
measures of case officer levels of 
influence over sources. Measures of 
influence that are sometimes misla-
beled as control include the follow-
ing:
• Does an agent fully disclose sub-
sources of information?
• Has an agent attempted to estab-
lished limits to subjects he will 
and will not report about?
• Is an agent willing to admit when 
he does not know about a topic 
and will he take reasonable risks to 
gain that information?
• Is an agent knowingly providing 
information that would get him in 
trouble if discovered?
• How closely does an agent adhere 
to the directions a case officer 
gives concerning methods of col-
lecting information and moving to 
and from meetings?
Authority also plays a key role in 
the handling, training, and turnover 
phases of the recruitment cycle. 
Once recruited, an agent should 
become both more productive (as a 
result of more direct tasking) and 
more cautious (as a result of train-
ing). Case officers must appear to be 
confident and skilled in the tra-
decraft they impart to their agents 
and, when the time comes for one 
officer to move on and another to 
take over, case officers must 
smoothly transfer their authority to 
their replacements.
RASCLS: Scarcity
When an item is less available 
humans tend to believe it is more 
attractive. 26 Things that are rarer are 
normally more expensive, and 
humans tend to equate expense with 
quality. Also things that are less 
available may be rare because many 
others want the same thing—the 
concept of social proof plays in here 
(more on that concept later). On a 
deeper level, when an item or option 
is offered and then withdrawn, 
humans tend to desire that item or 
option even more. This is the con-
cept of “psychological reactance,” or 
as it is more commonly known, the 
“Romeo and Juliet effect.” 27
Scarcity is a recurrent element of a 
successful recruitment. Recruitment 
pitches should make clear to poten-
tial agents that they are being pre-
sented with fleeting opportunities to 
act on statements they have made 
concerning their beliefs, goals, or 
ideals. But, by emphasizing that any 
opportunity is fleeting and urging a 
rapid commitment, a case officer 
increases the value of the opportu-
nity to replace words with deeds. 
Case officers might emphasize, for 
example, that they have superiors 
who need proof of their agents’ util-
ity or they will order relationships 
ended.
By building this sense of urgency, 
a successful case officer will use 
scarcity to overcome the free-rider 
dilemma and get agents to commit to 
new and deeper relationships.
RASCLS: Commitment and 
Consistency
“Prominent theorists such as Leon 
Festinger, Fritz Hieder, and Theo-
dore Newcomb have viewed the 
desire for consistency as a central 
motivator of our behavior.” 28 In 
short, portraying ourselves as “con-
sistent” speaks to who we humans 
are at our essence. Society generally 
seems to spurn members who are 
inconsistent. They are labeled as 
“untrustworthy” or, in more current 
political terms, “flip-floppers.” At 
times we even appear to admire con-
sistency over correctness. However 
we do not always cling to positions 
simply because we are stubborn. 
26 Or, as Cialdini put it, “Opportunities seem more valuable when their availability is limited.” Cialdini, 238.
27 Cialdini, 244 and 248.
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In the agent recruitment process, small commitments in the de-
velopment phase … can grow into full recruitments.
Studies have shown we actually tend 
to increase our confidence in a deci-
sion once that decision has been 
made and particularly if that deci-
sion has been made publicly. “Pub-
lic commitments create more lasting 
change,” even more so if those pub-
lic commitments are written or oth-
erwise recorded. 29
Researchers studying Chinese 
interrogation techniques during the 
Korean War found that the Commu-
nist Chinese exploited this quality of 
human nature to elicit “confessions” 
from US POWs to back allegations 
of US war crimes during the war.  30 
They found that the Chinese and 
North Koreans managed to get US 
Air Force officers to claim on film 
that they had dropped “germ bombs” 
and committed other war crimes, not 
by threats, torture, or offers of 
rewards for lying, but by getting 
prisoners to make public admissions 
that life was not perfect in the 
United States and then having them 
write, expand upon, and defend their 
declarations. Slowly, trying to be 
consistent, many of these men came 
to believe, at least for a time, that 
they had indeed committed war 
crimes. Going from “there is some 
racial inequality” to “the United 
States is committing genocide in 
North Korea” was not a path every 
prisoner would take, but it worked 
often enough for some propaganda 
gains for the Chinese and Koreans.
In the agent recruitment process, 
small commitments in the develop-
ment phase—for example, mutual 
agreement that two countries often 
need informal channels to better 
understand each other—can grow 
into full recruitments. Additionally, 
by convincing a prospective agent to 
provide the first piece of nonpublic 
information (for example the classic 
“internal telephone directory”), the 
stage is set to ask for more closely 
held secrets and then use this behav-
ior to justify further cooperation 
through recruitment. This does not 
necessarily imply setting up black-
mail, but rather an appeal to an 
agent’s desire to remain consistent. 
By highlighting past agreement to 
“share data” for the good of both 
countries, the relationship with a 
case officer can evolve into one seen 
as rewarding to both and lay the 
ground for continued “cooperation.”
RASCLS: Liking
“We like people who are like us.” 
Every case officer is taught this sim-
ple idea in training. The larger les-
son is to find ways to connect with 
potential agents—similarities in 
background (the case officer and 
agent are both sons/daughters, hus-
bands/wives, parents, have similar 
personality traits), shared interests 
(sports, hobbies), and general out-
look (interested in world affairs, 
background, life-style). Flattery is 
highly recommended, for virtually 
everyone enjoys being praised, and 
future meetings will come more eas-
ily. With additional meetings and 
more “time on target,” a case officer 
will be better able to conduct a 
sound assessment process. A warm 
relationship is also likely to give a 
case officer insight into a potential 
agent’s areas of low self-esteem or 
feelings of being undervalued—key 
pieces of knowledge for a recruiter.
Liking matters throughout the 
agent recruitment cycle. A case offi-
cer creates an ever deeper relation-
ship through the process—from 
becoming an “associate” then a 
“friend” in the assessment phases 
and then moving to the role of 
“sounding board” and “confidant” as 
development moves to recruitment. 
A case officer’s goal should be to 
have a prospective agent come to 
believe, hopefully with good reason, 
that the case officer is one of the few 
people, perhaps the ONLY person, 
who truly understands him. The 
agent then can look forward to each 
meeting as a chance to spend qual-
ity time with a comrade he can trust 
with his life.
RASCLS: Social Proof
By observing others, particularly 
in unfamiliar environments, humans 
determine what is “correct behav-
ior.” This is what Cialdini and other 
psychologists call “social proof,” 
and it can be seen in long lines 
behind velvet ropes at the hottest 
night clubs or, more darkly, in the 
29 Ibid., 76.
30 Cialdini, 71–72, and Albert D. Bidderman, “Communist Attempts to Elicit False Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War,” presented at a combined 
meeting of the Section on Neurology and Psychiatry with the New York Neurological Society at The New York Academy of Medicine, 13 November 1956, as 
part of a Panel Discussion on “Communist Methods of Interrogation and Indoctrination.” The report is based on work done under ARDC Project No. 7733, 
Task 77314, in support of the research and development program of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.  
Permission is granted for reproduction, translation, publication, use, and disposal in whole and in part by or for the United States Government.16 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 57, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2013) 
 
Six Principles of Agent Recruitment behavior of people in cults. 31 The 
combined effects of social proof and 
the power of commitment and con-
sistency can explain tragedies like 
the mass suicide in November 1978 
of the Jonestown cult in Guyana and 
can also be helpful in understanding 
why Oleg Penkovsky continued to 
spy even after it was clear Soviet 
authorities were closing in on him. 
Once individuals have invested 
deeply and sacrificed much, they 
will go to great lengths to hold on to 
the beliefs to which they had 
become committed.
Although we cannot put a velvet 
rope outside our facilities abroad and 
have agents line up to provide social 
proof that spying for the United 
States is the rage, the principle of 
social proof does apply to agent 
recruitment and handling. In direct-
ing agents, case officers can say, 
“Other partners I have worked with 
have brought out documents by 
doing X.” This both serves to 
encourage an agent should not only 
to do “X” but reassures the agent 
that he is doing what others have 
done successfully as well. Addition-
ally officers can help agents over-
come their understandable anxiety 
by recalling cases of others who 
have made similar choices, for 
example, Ryszard Kuklinski or Ist-
van Belovai, whose actions helped 
free their countries. However, the 
ultimate social proof is the presence 
of the case officer, and implicitly the 
organization behind the case officer, 
who provide constant reminders that 
an agent is doing the right thing.
Agents are RASCLS not MICE
Frameworks for understanding 
agents have advanced significantly 
with the science of psychology since 
the days of the OSS. While advice 
from that era can still be useful 
today, we now have a much better 
understanding of the human mind 
and motivations. The MICE frame-
work was a good step in trying to 
understand agent behavior but it has 
often led officers to unduly focus on 
vulnerabilities and caused case offi-
cers to see their assets in a one-
dimensional and somewhat negative 
light.
I believe the RASCLS model is 
more nuanced, effective, and 
founded on empirical data drawn 
from decades of experiments in the 
social psychology field. 
By employing RASCLS we can 
see that Pyotr Popov did not just spy 
for money but because his case offi-
cer, George Kisevalter, reminded 
him strongly of his older brother, 
who had opposed the Soviet regime 
(the liking and authority principles). 
Kisevalter gave him the money he 
needed, but he also helped him 
appear to be a competent intelli-
gence officer in post-war Vienna 
(reciprocation). Finally, his case offi-
cer reinforced Popov’s feelings that 
the Soviet state had betrayed Rus-
sian peasants and only the United 
States was strong enough to eventu-
ally help these people free them-
selves from their oppressors 
(commitment and consistency). 
In the same way, Cherkashin 
expertly turned Ames from a one-
time contact in need of money into a 
productive agent by flattering him 
(liking) and telling him the two men 
were partners in keeping Ames 
safe—a partnership that relied on 
Ames’s help (authority, reciproca-
tion). It was a partnership that would 
allow Ames to enjoy the compensa-
tion Cherkashin was ready to supply 
on a steady basis (commitment and 
consistency). In the light of the 
RASCLS model, the actions of each 
of the spies discussed in this article, 
Philby, Montes, Ames, and others 
become more understandable, with 
lessons that can be applied to other 
cases.
The above suggestions for using 
Cialdini’s six principles, in my judg-
ment, only touch on the ways in 
which these principles could be 
employed in operations. As always, 
it will be up to the imagination and 
creativity of individual case officers 
to take the principles and turn them 
into new approaches for recruiting 
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